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Bacon's Aphorisms
Francis Bacon,
The Aphorisms, from The Interpretation of Nature
The Works, ed. and trans. Basil Montague,
3 vols. (Philadelphia: Parry & MacMillan, 1854), 3: 345-360.
SUMMARY OF THE SECOND PART, DIGESTED IN APHORISMS.
APHORISMS ON THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE AND THE EMPIRE OF MAN.
1. MAN, as the minister and interpreter of nature, does and understands as much as his observations on the
order of nature, either with regard to things or the mind, permit him, and neither knows nor is capable of more.
2. The unassisted hand, and the understanding left to itself, possess but little power. Effects are produced by
the means of instruments and helps, which the understanding requires no less than the hand. And as instruments
either promote or regulate the motion of the hand, so those that are applied to the mind prompt or protect the
understanding.
3. Knowledge and human power are synonymous, since the ignorance of the cause frustrates the effect. For
nature is only subdued by submission, and that which in contemplative philosophy corresponds with the cause, in
practical science becomes the rule.
4. Man, whilst operating, can only apply or withdraw natural bodies; nature, internally, performs the rest.
5. Those who become practically versed in nature, are the mechanic, the mathematician, the physician, the
alchymist, and the magician; but all (as matters now stand) with faint efforts and meagre success.
6. It would be madness, and inconsistency, to suppose that things which have never yet been performed, can be
performed without employing some hitherto untried means.
7. The creations of the mind and hand appear very numerous, if we judge by books and manufactures : but all
that variety consists of an excessive refinement, and of deductions from a few well known matters; not of a number
of axioms.
8. Even the effects already discovered are due to chance and experiment, rather than to the sciences. For our
present sciences are nothing more than peculiar arrangements of matters already discovered, and not methods for
discovery, or plans for new operations.
9. The sole cause and root of almost every defect in the sciences is this; that whilst we falsely admire and extol
the powers of the human mind, we do not search for its real helps.
10. The subtilty of nature is far beyond that of sense or of the understanding: so that the specious meditations,
speculations, and theories of mankind, are but a kind of insanity, only there is no one to stand by and observe it.
11. As the present sciences are useless for the discovery of effects, so the present system of logic is useless for
the discovery of the sciences.
12. The present system of logic rather assists in confirming and rendering inveterate the errors founded on
vulgar notions, than in searching after truth; and is therefore more hurtful than useful.
13. The syllogism is not applied to the principles of the sciences, and is of no avail in intermediate axioms, as
being very unequal to the subtilty of nature. It forces assent, therefore, and not things.
14. The syllogism consists of propositions, propositions of words, words are the signs of notions. If, therefore,
the notions (which form the basis of the whole) be confused and carelessly abstracted from things, there is no
solidity in the superstructure. Our only hope, then, is in genuine induction.
15. We have no sound notions either in logic or physics; substance, quality, action, passion, and existence are
not clear notions; much less, weight, levity, density, tenuity, moisture, dryness, generation, corruption, attraction,
repulsion, element, matter, form, and the like. They are all fantastical and ill defined.
16. The notions of less abstract natures, as man, dog, dove; and the immediate perceptions of sense, as heat,
cold, white, black, do not deceive us materially, yet even these are sometimes confused by the mutability of matter
and the intermixture of things. All the rest, which men have hitherto employed, are errors; and improperly
abstracted and deduced from things.
17. There is the same degree of licentiousness and error in forming axioms, as in abstracting notions: and that in
the first principles, which depend on common induction. Still more is this the case in axioms and inferior
propositions derived from syllogisms.
18. The present discoveries in science are such as lie immediately beneath the surface of common notions. It is
necessary, however, to penetrate (p.346) the more secret and remote parts of nature, in order to abstract both
notions and axioms from things, by a more certain and guarded method.
19. There are and can exist but two ways of investigating and discovering truth. The one hurries on rapidly
from the senses and particulars to the most general axioms; and from them as principles and their supposed
indisputable truth derives and discovers the intermediate axioms. This is the way now in use. The other constructs
its axioms from the senses and particulars, by ascending continually and gradually, till it finally arrives at the most
general axioms, which is the true but unattempted way.
20. The understanding when left to itself proceeds by the same way as that which it would have adopted under
the guidance of logic, namely, the first. For the mind is fond of starting off to generalities, that it may avoid labour,
and after dwelling a little on a subject is fatigued by experiment. But these evils are augmented by logic, for the sake
of the ostentation of dispute.
21. The understanding when left to itself in a man of a steady, patient, and reflecting disposition, (especially
when unimpeded by received doctrines,) makes some attempt in the right way, but with little effect; since the
understanding, undirected and unassisted, is unequal to and unfit for the task of vanquishing the obscurity of things.
22. Each of these two ways begins from the senses and particulars, and ends in the greatest generalities. But
they are immeasurably different; for the one merely touches cursorily the limits of experiment, and particulars,
whilst the other runs duly and regularly through them; the one from the very outset lays down some abstract and
useless generalities, the other gradually rises to those principles which are really the most common in nature.
23. There is no small difference between the idols of the human mind, and the ideas of the divine mind; that is
to say, between certain idle dogmas, and the real stamp and impression of created ohjects, as they are found in
nature.
24. Axioms determined upon in argument can never assist in the discovery of new effects: for the subtilty of
nature is vastly superior to that of argument. But axioms properly and regularly abstracted from particulars, easily
point out and define new particulars, and therefore impart activity to the sciences.
25. The axioms now in use are derived from a scanty handful, as it were, of experience, and a few particulars of
frequent occurrence, whence they are of much the same dimensions or extent as their origin. And if any neglected or
unknown instance occurs, the axiom is saved by some frivolous distinction, when it would be more consistent with
truth to amend it.
26. We are wont, for the sake of distinction, to call that human reasoning which we apply to nature, the
anticipation of nature, (as being rash and premature;) and that which is properly deduced from things, the
interpretation of nature.
27. Anticipations are sufficiently powerful in producing unanimity, for if men were all to become even
uniformly mad, they might agree tolerably well with each other.
28. Anticipations again will be assented to much more readily than interpretations; because, being deduced
from a few instances, and these principally of familiar occurrence, they immediately hit the understanding, and
satisfy the imagination; whilst, on the contrary, interpretations, being deduced from various subjects, and these
widely dispersed, cannot suddenly strike the understanding; so that, in common estimation, they must appear
difficult and discordant, and almost like the mysteries of faith.
29. In sciences founded on opinions and dogmas, it is right to make use of anticipations and logic, if you wish to
force assent rather than things.
30. If all the capacities of all ages should unite and combine and transmit their labours, no great progress will be
made in learning by anticipations; because the radical errors, and those which occur in the first process of the mind,
are not cured by the excellence of subsequent means and remedies.
31. It is in vain to expect any great progress in the sciences by the superinducing or engrafting new matters
upon old. An instauration must be made from the very foundations, if we do not wish to revolve forever in a circle,
making only some slight and contemptible progress.
32. The ancient authors, and all others, are left in undisputed possession of their honours. For we enter into no
comparison of capacity or talent, but of method; and assume the part of a guide, rather than of a critic.
33. To speak plainly, no correct judgment can be formed, either of our method, or its discoveries, by those
anticipations which are now in common use; for it is not to be required of us to submit ourselves to the judgment of
the very method we ourselves arraign.
34. Nor is it an easy matter to deliver and explain our sentiments: for those things which are in themselves new
can yet be only understood from some analogy to what is old.
35. Alexander Borgia said of the expedition of the French into Italy, that they came with chalk in their hands to
mark up their lodgings, and not with weapons to force their passage. Even so do we wish our philosophy to make
its way quietly into those minds that are fit for it, and of good capacity. For we have no need of contention where we
differ in first principles, and our very notions, and even in our forms of demonstration.
36. We have but one simple method of delivering (p.347) our sentiments: namely, we must bring men to
particulars, and their regular series and order, and they must for a while renounce their notions and begin to form an
acquaintance with things.
37. Our method and that of the skeptics agree in some respects at first setting out: but differ most widely and
are completely opposed to each other in their conclusion. For they roundly assert that nothing can be known; we,
that but a small part of nature can be known by the present method. Their next step, however, is to destroy the
authority of the senses and understanding, whilst we invent and supply them with assistance.
38. The idols and false notions which have already preoccupied the human understanding, and are deeply
rooted in it, not only to beset man's minds, that they become difficult of access, but, even when access is obtained,
will again meet and trouble us in the instauration of the sciences, unless mankind, when forewarned, guard
themselves with all possible care against them.
39. Four species of idols beset the human mind: to which (for distinction's sake) we have assigned names:
calling the first idols of the tribe; the second idols of the den; the third idols of the market; the fourth idols of the
theatre.
40. The formation of notions and axioms on the foundation of true induction, is the only fitting remedy, by
which we can ward off and expel these idols. It is, however, of great service to point them out. For the doctrine of
idols bears the same relation to the interpretation of nature, as that of confutation of sophisms does to common logic.
41. The idols of the tribe are inherent in human nature, and the very tribe or race of man. For man's sense is
falsely asserted to be the standard of things. On the contrary, all the perceptions, both of the senses and the mind,
bear reference to man, and not to the universe, and the human mind resembles those uneven mirrors, which impart
their own properties to different objects, from which rays are emitted, and distort and disfigure them.
42. The idols of the den are those of each individual. For everybody (in addition to the errors common to the
race of man) has his own individual den or cavern, which intercepts and corrupts the light of nature; either from his
own peculiar and singular disposition, or from his education and intercourse with others, or from his reading, and
the authority acquired by those whom he reverences and admires, or from the different impressions produced on
the mind, as it happens to be preoccupied and predisposed, or equable and tranquil, and the like: so that the spirit of
man (according to its several dispositions) is variable, confused, and as it were actuated by chance; and Heraclitus
said well that men search for knowledge in lesser worlds, and not in the greater or common world.
43. There are also idols formed by the reciprocal intercourse and society of man with man, which we call idols
of the market, from the commerce and association of men with each other. For men converse by means of language;
but words are formed at the will of the generality; and there arises from a bad and unapt formation of words a
wonderful obstruction to the mind. Nor can the definitions and explanations, with which learned men are wont to
guard and protect themselves in some instances, afford a complete remedy: words still manifestly force the
understanding, throw every thing into confusion, and lead mankind into vain and innumerable controversies and
fallacies.
44. Lastly, there are idols which have crept into men’s minds from the various dogmas of peculiar systems of
philosophy, and also from the perverted rules of demonstration, and these we denominate idols of the theatre. For
we regard all the systems of philosophy hitherto received or imagined, as so many plays brought out and
performed, creating fictitious and theatrical worlds. Nor do we speak only of the present systems, or of the
philosophy and sects of the ancients, since numerous other plays of a similar nature can be still composed and made
to agree with each other, the causes of the most opposite errors being generally the same. Nor, again, do we allude
merely to general systems, but also to many elements and axioms of sciences, which have become inveterate by
tradition, implicit credence, and neglect. We must, however, discuss each species of idols more fully and distinctly,
in order to guard the human understanding against them.
45. The human understanding, from its peculiar nature, easily supposes a greater degree of order and equality
in things than it really finds; and although many things in nature be sui generis, and most irregular, will yet invent
parallels and conjugates, and relatives where no such thing is. Hence the fiction, that all celestial bodies were in
perfect circles, thus rejecting entirely spiral and serpentine lines, (except as explanatory terms.) Hence, also, the
element of fire is introduced with its peculiar orbit, to keep square with those other three which are objects of our
senses. The relative rarity of the elements (as they are called) is arbitrarily made to vary in tenfold progression, with
many other dreams of the like nature. Nor is this folly confined to theories, but it is to be met with even in simple
notions.
46. The human understanding, when any preposition has been once laid down, (either from general admission
and belief, or from the pleasure (p.348) it affords,) forces every thing else to add fresh support and confirmation; and
although more cogent and abundant instances may exist to the contrary, yet either does not observe or despises
them, or gets rid of and rejects them by some distinction, with violent and injurious prejudice, rather than sacrifice
the authority of its first conclusions. It was well answered by him who was shown in a temple the votive tablets
suspended by such as had escaped the peril of shipwreck, and was pressed as to whether he would then recognise
the power of the gods, by an inquiry; "But where are the portraits of those who have perished in spite of their
vows?" All superstition is much the same, whether it be that of astrology, dreams, omens, retributive judgment, or
the like; in all of which the deluded believers observe events which are fulfilled, but neglect and pass over their
failure, though it be much more common. But this evil insinuates itself still more craftily in philosophy and the
sciences; in which a settled maxim vitiates and governs every other circumstance, though the latter be much more
worthy of confidence. Besides, even in the absence of that eagerness and want of thought, (which we have
mentioned,) it is the peculiar and perpetual error of the human understanding to be more moved and excited by
affirmatives than by negatives, whereas it ought duly and regularly to be impartial; nay, in establishing any true
axiom, the negative instance is the most powerful.
47. The human understanding is most excited by that which strikes and enters the mind at once and suddenly,
and by which the imagination is immediately filled and inflated. It then begins almost imperceptibly to conceive and
suppose that every thing is similar to the few objects which have taken possession of the mind; whilst it is very slow
and unfit for the transition to the remote and heterogeneous instances, by which axioms are tried as by fire, unless
the office be imposed upon it by severe regulations, and a powerful authority.
48. The human understanding is active and cannot halt or rest, but even, though without effect, still presses
forward. Thus we cannot conceive of any end or external boundary of the world, and it seems necessarily to occur to
us, that there must be something beyond. Nor can we imagine how eternity has flowed on down to the present day,
since the usually received distinction of an infinity, a parte ante and a parte post, cannot hold good: for it would
thence follow that one infinity is greater than another, and also that infinity is wasting away and tending to an end.
There is the same difficulty in considering the infinite divisibility of lines, arising from the weakness of our minds,
which weakness interferes to still greater disadvantage with the discovery of causes. For, although the greatest
generalities in nature must be positive, just as they are found, and in fact not causable, yet, the human
understanding, incapable of resting, seeks for something more intelligible. Thus, however, whilst aiming at further
progress, it falls back to what is actually less advanced, namely, final causes; for they are clearly more allied to man's
own nature than the system of the universe; and from this source they have wonderfully corrupted philosophy. But
he would be an unskilful and shallow philosopher, who should seek for causes in the greatest generalities, and not
be anxious to discover them in subordinate objects.
49. The human understanding resembles not a dry light, but admits a tincture of the will and passions, which
generate their own system accordingly: for man always believes more readily that which he prefers. He, therefore,
rejects difficulties for want of patience in investigation; sobriety, because it limits his hope; the depths of nature,
from superstition; the light of experiment, from arrogance and pride, lest his mind should appear to be occupied
with common and varying objects; paradoxes, from a fear of the opinion of the vulgar; in short, his feelings imbue
and corrupt his understanding in innumerable and sometimes imperceptible ways.
50. But by far the greatest impediment and aberration of the human understanding proceeds from the dulness,
incompetency, and errors of the senses: since whatever strikes the senses preponderates over every thing, however
superior, which does not immediately strike them. Hence contemplation mostly ceases with sight; and a very scanty,
or perhaps no regard is paid to invisible objects. The entire operation, therefore, of spirits enclosed in tangible bodies
is concealed and escapes us. All that more delicate change of formation in the parts of coarser substances (vulgarly
called alteration, but in fact a change of position in the smallest particles) is equally unknown; and yet, unless the
two matters we have mentioned be explored and brought to light, no great effect can be produced in nature. Again,
the very nature of common air, and all bodies of less density (of which there are many) is almost unknown. For the
senses are weak and erring, nor can instruments be of great use in extending their sphere or acuteness; all the better
interpretations of nature are worked out by instances, and fit and apt experiments, where the senses only judge of
the experiment, the experiment of nature and the thing itself.
51. The human understanding is, by its own nature, prone to abstraction, and supposes that which is fluctuating
to be fixed. But it is better to dissect than abstract nature; such was the method employed by the school of
Democritus, which made greater progress in penetrating nature than the rest. It is best to consider matter, its (p.349)
conformation, and the changes of that conformation, its own action, and the law of this action or motion, for forms
are a mere fiction of the human mind, unless you will call the laws of action by that name. Such are the idols of the
tribe, which arise either from the uniformity of the constitution of man's spirit, or its prejudices, or its limited
faculties, or restless agitation, or from the interference of the passions, or the incompetency of the senses, or the
mode of their impressions.
53. The idols of the den derive their origin from the peculiar nature of each individual's mind and body; and
also from education, habit, and accident. And although they be various and manifold, yet we will treat of some that
require the greatest caution, and exert the greatest power in polluting the understanding.
54. Some men become attached to particular sciences and contemplations, either from supposing themselves
the authors and inventors of them, or from having bestowed the greatest pains upon such subjects, and thus become
most habituated to them. If men of this description apply themselves to philosophy and contemplations of an
universal nature, they wrest and corrupt them by their preconceived fancies; of which Aristotle affords us a signal
instance, who made his natural philosophy completely subservient to his logic, and thus rendered it little more than
useless and disputatious. The chymists, again, have formed a fanciful philosophy with the most confined views,
from a few experiments of the furnace. Gilbert, too, having employed himself most assiduously in the consideration
of the magnet, immediately established a system of philosophy to coincide with his favourite pursuit.
55. The greatest, and, perhaps, radical distinction between different men's dispositions for philosophy and the
sciences is this; that some are more vigorous and active in observing the differences of things, others in observing
their resemblances. For a steady and acute disposition can fix its thoughts, and dwell upon, and adhere to a point,
through all the refinements of differences; but those that are sublime and discursive recognise and compare even the
most delicate and general resemblances. Each of them readily falls into excess, by catching either at nice distinctions
or shadows of resemblance.
56. Some dispositions evince an unbounded admiration of antiquity, others eagerly embrace novelty; and but
few can preserve the just medium, so as neither to tear up what the ancients have correctly laid down, nor to despise
the just innovations of the moderns. But this is very prejudicial to the sciences and philosophy, and, instead of a
correct judgment, we have but the factions of the ancients and moderns. Truth is not to be sought in the good
fortune of any particular conjuncture of time, which is uncertain, but in the light of nature and experience, which is
eternal. Such factions, therefore, are to be abjured, and the understanding must not allow them to hurry it on to
assent.
57. The contemplation of nature and of bodies in their individual form distracts and weakens the
understanding: but the contemplation of nature and of bodies in their general composition and formation stupifies
and relaxes it. We have a good instance of this in the school of Leucippus and Democritus compared with others: for
they applied themselves so much to particulars as almost to neglect the general structure of things, whilst the others
were so astounded whilst gazing on the structure, that they did not penetrate the simplicity of nature. These two
species of contemplation must therefore be interchanged, and each employed in its turn, in order to render the
understanding at once penetrating and capacious, and to avoid the inconveniences we have mentioned, and the idols
that result from them.
58. Let such, therefore, be our precautions in contemplation, that we may ward off and expel the idols of the
den: which mostly owe their birth either to some predominant pursuit; or, secondly, to an excess in synthesis and
analysis; or, thirdly, to a party zeal in favour of certain ages; or, fourthly, to the extent or narrowness of the subject.
In general, he who contemplates nature should suspect whatever particularly takes and fixes his understanding, and
should use so much the more caution to preserve it equable and unprejudiced.
59. The idols of the market are the most troublesome of all, those, namely, which have entwined themselves
round the understanding from the associations of words and names. For men imagine that their reason governs
words, whilst, in fact, words react upon the understanding; and this has rendered philosophy and the sciences
sophistical and inactive. Words are generally formed in a popular sense, and define things by those broad lines
which are most obvious to the vulgar mind; but when a more acute understanding, or more diligent observation is
anxious to vary those lines, and to adapt them more accurately to nature, words oppose it. Hence the great and
solemn disputes of learned men often terminate in controversies about words and names, in regard to which it
would be better (imitating the caution of mathematicians) to proceed more advisedly in the first instance, and to
bring such disputes to a regular issue by definitions. Such definitions, however, cannot remedy the evil in natural
and material objects, because they consist themselves of words, and these words produce others; so that we must
necessarily have recourse to particular instances, and their regular (p.350) series and arrangement, as we shall
mention when we come to the mode and scheme of determining notions and axioms.
60. The idols imposed upon the understanding by words are of two kinds. They are either the names of things
which have no existence, (for, as some objects are from inattention left without a name, so names are formed by
fanciful imaginations which are without an object,) or they are the names of actual objects, but confused, badly
defined, and hastily and irregularly abstracted from things. Fortune, the primum mobile, the planetary orbits, the
element of fire, and the like fictions, which owe their birth to futile and false theories, are instances of the first kind.
And this species of idols is removed with greater facility, because it can be exterminated by the constant refutation
or the desuetude of the theories themselves. The others, which are created by vicious and unskilful abstraction, are
intricate and deeply rooted. Take some word for instance, as moist; and let us examine how far the different
significations of this word are consistent. It will be found that the word moist is nothing but a confused sign of
different actions, admitting of no settled and defined uniformity. For it means that which easily diffuses itself over
another body; that which is indeterminable and cannot be brought to a consistency; that which yields easily in every
direction; that which is easily divided and dispersed; that which is easily united and collected; that which easily
flows and is put in motion; that which easily adheres to and wets another body; that which is easily reduced to a
liquid state, though previously solid. When, therefore, you come to predicate or impose this name, in one sense
flame is moist, in another air is not moist, in another fine powder is moist, in another glass is moist; so that it is quite
clear that this notion is hastily abstracted from water only, and common, ordinary liquors, without any due
verification of it.
There are, however, different degrees of distortion and mistake in words. One of the least faulty classes is that
of the names of substances, particularly of the less abstract and more defined species; (those then of chalk and mud
are good, of earth, bad;) words signifying actions are more faulty, as to generate, to corrupt, to change; but the most
faulty are those denoting qualities, (except the immediate objects of sense,) as heavy, light, rare, dense. Yet in all of
these there must be some notions a little better than others, in proportion as a greater or less number of things come
before the senses.
61. The idols of the theatre are not innate, nor do they introduce themselves secretly into the understanding; but
they are manifestly instilled and cherished by the fictions of theories and depraved rules of demonstration. To
attempt, however, or undertake their confutation, would not be consistent with our declarations. For, since we
neither agree in our principles nor our demonstrations, all argument is out of the question. And it is fortunate that
the ancients are left in possession of their honours. We detract nothing from them, seeing our whole doctrine relates
only to the path to be pursued. The lame (as they say) in the path outstrip the swift, who wander from it, and it is
clear that the very skill and swiftness of him who runs not in the right direction, must increase his aberration.
Our method of discovering the sciences is such as to leave little to the acuteness and strength of wit, and indeed
rather to level wit and intellect. For, as in the drawing of a line or accurate circle by the hand, much depends upon its
steadiness and practice, but if a ruler or compass be employed there is little occasion for either; so it is with our
method. Although, however, we enter into no individual confutations, yet a little must be said, first, of the sects and
general divisions of these species of theories; secondly, something further to show that there are external signs of
their weakness, and, lastly, we must consider the causes of so great a misfortune, and so long and general a
unanimity in error, that we may thus render the access to truth less difficult, and that the human understanding may
the more readily be purified, and brought to dismiss its idols.
62. The idols of the theatre or of theories are numerous, and may and perhaps will be still more so. For, unless
men's minds had been now occupied for many ages in religious and theological considerations, and civil
governments (especially monarchies) had been averse to novelties of that nature, even in theory, (so that men must
apply to them with some risk and injury to their own fortunes, and not only without reward, but subject to
contumely and envy,) there is no doubt that many other sects of philosophers and theorists would have been
introduced, like those which formerly flourished in such diversified abundance amongst the Greeks. For, as many
imaginary theories of the heavens can be deduced from the phenomena of the sky, so it is even more easy to found
many dogmas upon the phenomena of philosophy; and the plot of this our theatre resembles those of the poetical,
where the plots which are invented for the stage are more consistent, elegant, and pleasurable than those taken from
real history.
In general, men take for the groundwork of their philosophy either too much from a few topics, or too little
from many; in either case their philosophy is founded on too narrow a basis of experiment and natural history, and
decides on too scanty grounds. For the theoretic philosopher seizes various common circumstances by experiment,
(p.351) without reducing them to certainty, or examining and frequently considering them, and relies for the rest
upon meditation and the activity of his wit.
There are other philosophers who have diligently and accurately attended to a few experiments, and have
thence presumed to deduce and invent systems of philosophy, forming every thing to conformity with them.
A third set, from their faith and religious veneration, introduce theology and traditions; the absurdity of some
amongst them having proceeded so far as to seek and derive the sciences from spirits and genii. There are, therefore,
three sources of error and three species of false philosophy; the sophistic, empiric, and superstitious.
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